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to be a lasting formulation. Brennan's opinion may be just a first step
towards eventual adoption of a standard similar to that espoused by
Justices Douglas and Powell. The possibility that Keyes will not be the
lasting standard is increased by the fact that only four justices joined in
the opinion and that the views of two other justices, Burger and White,
are not known at all. However, if the four justices joining the Keyes
opinion do not change their position, it is difficult to conceive of the
other five being able to concur in any one new standard.
At this writing, the Court has accepted no major school cases for
its October 1973 docket. 6 It seems likely that the Court will wait until
the effects of Keyes can be known before moving significantly further.
Keyes has left the Court sorely divided in an area where it has been the
clear leader in forcing change and is now acting almost alone.67 The
decision has done little to clear up the growing confusion about what
standard of conduct a school board must adhere to. It is incumbent
upon the Court, it if wishes to maintain the process begun twenty years
ago in Brown, to decide what the constitutional right to integrated
schools is, what standard will determine that right, and how the goal of
equal educational opportunity is to be achieved.
JACK GOODMAN
Criminal Procedure-Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Analysis In Its Infancy
In Hart v. Coiner,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed a life sentence imposed under West Virginia's habitual offender
"Petition for certiorari has been filed in the Detroit case, where de jure segregation was found.
The central question there is not the existence of actionable segregation, but whether a metropoli-
tan area wide plan may be ordered in a situation where integrating within the central school district
alone, would have little effect. Bradley v. Milliken, No. 72-1809 (6th Cir., June 12, 1973) (en bane);
petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1973) (No. 73-475).
The Court recently declined to hear two other Northern school cases involving allegedly de
jure acts. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.
Ct. 3066 (1973) (Indianapolis, Ind.); Davis v. School District, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 913 (1971) (Pontiac, Mich.).
6 There may be some Congressional input forthcoming. In particular this would concern
remedies, one proposal being similar to the approach suggested by Justice Powell see Preyer,
Beyond Desegregation-What Ought to be Done?, 51 N.C.L. REv. 657 (1973).
'No. 71-1885 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973). The case was argued by two third-year law students
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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statute,2 holding that it was "constitutionally excessive and wholly dis-
proportionate to the nature of the offenses . ..committed, and not
necessary to achieve any legitimate legislative purpose."'3 This case
Marks the first time that a federal court has attempted to set forth in a
systematic fashion objective criteria for analyzing the proportionality of
punishment to crime under the eighth amendment.4 Although the deci-
sion is an important step forward, uncertainty persists in the application
of this theory because of the court's failure to justify explicitly the
criteria that it used and because of the United States Supreme Court's
scarce and somewhat uncertain precedent in this area.
THE DECISION
Petitioner Dewey Hart was convicted of perjury in a West Virginia
court for testimony that he had given at his son's murder trial. Before
the court sentenced him, the state filed an information charging him
with being an habitual offender on the basis of two prior felony convic-
tions5- one in 1949 for writing a check for fifty dollars on insufficient
funds and the other in 1955 for transporting a forged check worth 140
dollars across state lines. Following a jury finding that Hart had vio-
lated the recidivist statute, the trial judge imposed the mandatory life
sentence required by the stature.' After Hart had unsuccessfully sought
post-conviction relief in the state courts, 7 he applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court, again without success.' From the order
denying the writ, he appealed to the Fourth Circuit.9
Before reaching the eighth amendment issue, Judge Craven, writing
for the majority, rejected the petitioner's contentions that (1) he was
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966).
'No. 71-1885 at 17.
'Many commentators had previously bemoaned the lack of attention given by the courts to
the application of the proportionality theory. See, e.g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crine, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1074-75 (1964); Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punish-
nent: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972); Note, The
Efrletiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36
N.Y.U.L. REV. 846, 848 (1961); Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996 (1964).
sWest Virginia's recidivist statute imposes a mandatory life sentence on anyone convicted of
three separate offenses "punishable by confinement in a penitentiary." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-
11-18 (1966).
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denied effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea
to the 1949 bad check charge 10 and that (2) the guilty plea in the 1949
case was unduly coerced." The court then faced the eighth amendment
issue and found that, although the West Virginia habitual offender stat-
ute was valid on its face and had been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court against due process and equal protection attacks,"
Hart's eighth amendment challenge was not foreclosed." The peti-
tioner, rather than attacking the statute itself, argued that the "recidivist
mandatory life sentence in this case"'' 4 was disproportionate to his offen-
ses and therefore in violation of the eighth amendment. 5
Turning to a proportionality analysis, the court noted that while the
theory's validity was well settled under the Supreme Court's decision in
Weems v. United States6 and its own decision in Ralph v. Warden,7
its application was difficult because its meaning is drawn from "'the
"Id. at 4-5 n.2. Even though this issue is beyond the scope of this note, it does merit brief
observation. Had the majority reached an opposite result on this issue, the eighth amendment
inquiry would have been precluded. Id. at 26 (Boreman, J., dissenting). In the court's eagerness to
reach the eighth amendment question, it might have limited well-established Fourth Circuit preced-
ent that late appointment of counsel is so inherently prejudicial as to constitute a prima facie case
of denial of effective assistance of counsel. Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 1970);
Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1967); Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670, 673 (4th
Cir. 1967); Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549, 551-52 (4th Cir. 1966); see Jones v. Cunningham,
313 F.2d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1963). The court in Hart asserted that the state rebutted this presump-
tion because the record showed that the defendant "admitted his guilt to his attorney," who in turn
advised him that he "'didn't have to plead guilty.'" No. 71-1885 at 4 n.2. However, Judge
Boreman noted that Hart told his attorney only that he was guilty because his name was on the
check, unaware that proof of several other elements was necessary for conviction of the crime
charged. Id. at 24-25 (dissenting opinion). Furthermore, the attorney failed to investigate the
validity of the prior conviction on which the 1949 recidivist charge was based. Id. at 25, On the
basis of precedent, the dissent appears to be sound. See Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 628-29
(4th Cir. 1967) (defendant was prejudiced by late appointment of counsel because his attorney did
not inquire into whether the defendant had committed all of the elements of the crime); Martin v.
Virginia, 365 F.2d 549, 552-53 (4th Cir. 1966) (attorney failed to consider whether the offense
charged was a misdemeanor rather than a felony and whether he should have requested a change
of venue); Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347, 351-52 (4th Cir. 1963) (attorney must pursue
avenues of defense, even after defendant tells him he is guilty).
"No. 71-1885 at 5 n.2.
12Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (due process); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912) (equal protection.) In response to the argument that the statute on its face inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment, Graham replied simply: "Nor can it be maintained that cruel and unusual
punishment has been inflicted." 224 U.S. at 631. This statement was not mentioned in Hart.
"3No. 71-1885 at 5-6. But see id. at 27-28 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
151d.
"-217 U.S. 349 (1910) (the landmark case first espousing the proportionality theory).
17438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970).
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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society' .. ."I' The court therefore set forth "several objective fac-
tors" to aid in its measurement of proportionality. The test employed
was a "cumulative one focusing on an analysis of the combined fac-
tors."' 9
The first objective factor examined by the court was the nature of
the offense itself with particular attention given to whether it involved
elements of violence or danger to a victim. Applying this criterion the
court found that none of the petitioner's offenses "involved violence or
danger of violence toward persons or property," and moreover that
there were mitigating circumstances in two of Hart's offenses .2 At his
son's murder trial Hart was faced with the moral dilemma of deciding
whether to tell the truth or to protect his son. In considering the 1949
conviction the court emphasized that had the face amount of the bad
check been a penny less, Hart could not have been given a life sentence."
The second objective factor employed by the court was the legisla-
tive purpose of the punishment.22 In response to the state's claim that
the recidivist statute's purpose was one of deterrence, the court stated
that a life sentence was "unnecessary to accomplish the legislative pur-
pose to protect society from an individual who has committed three
wholly nonviolent crimes over a period of twenty years" and was unnec-
essary to deter others "except on the theory that more is better. 2 3
The third criterion adopted was a comparison of the punishment
imposed to those that the petitioner could have received in other juris-
dictions. 24 The court found that the recidivist scheme in West Virginia
"is among the top four in the nation in terms of severity. 2 5 The court
gave particular attention to those ten states allowing a discretionary life
KNo. 71-1885 at 9 quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
"No. 71-1885 at 9.
2Ofd. at 10
21ld. at 3 n.I, 10. Passing a bad check of less than fifth dollars is punishable by confinement
in the county jail and not in a penitentiary. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-39 (1966). Thus, he would
have been exposed only to the possibility of an extra five year sentence as a second offender. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1968).
r-No. 71-1885 at 11-13 The court adopted Justice Brennan's view: "If there is a significantly
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, ...
the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
279 (1972) (citations omitted).
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sentence after three felony convictions. Since the provisions in these
jurisdictions provide for judicial consideration of the nature of the un-
derlying offenses, it appeared very unlikely that a sentencing judge
would have given life imprisonment to a petitioner in Hart's situation.
The final criterion utilized by the court was a comparison of the
punishment to punishments allowable for other crimes in the sentencing
jurisdiction.26 The court discovered that life imprisonment was available
in West Virginia only for conviction of first-degree murder, rape, and
kidnapping and that for other "grave crimes of violence" such as
second-degree murder and robbery, much less severe maximum sent-
ences are allowable.2 1 Only after the third conviction of these more
serious crimes would the mandatory life sentence apply. In conclusion
the court held that this analysis of the four "relevant criteria under the
eighth amendment" rendered the petitioner's punishment unconstitu-
tional.2
8
Judge Boreman dissented from the court's analysis and conclu-
sion.21 In a general attack on the test employed by the majority, he
argued that it was impossible to determine the relative weight given to
the various factors and that therefore the guidelines would be practically
impossible to apply to other cases. Noting the paucity of authority on
the application of the proportionality test, he concluded that he was
disturbed by the "chaos which may result from this decision."'30 Fur-
thermore, he specifically disagreed with the court's evaluation of the
nature of Hart's offenses. Asserting the inevitability of a statutory cut-
off point, he found that for purposes of constitutional analysis the fact
that the 1949 bad check was written for only fifty dollars was irrelevant.
Although he agreed it was technically true that Hart's crimes were not
violent ones, he stated that the petitioner's perjury occurred at a trial
on a murder charge, "one of the most serious and cold-blooded
crimes .... -31 Finally, Judge Boreman dismissed the majority's con-
cern for Hart's moral dilemma at his son's trial as one possibily appeal-
ing to a jury but inappropriate in the disposition of this appeal. The
strong suggestion in this dissent was that since the sentence was man-
dated by statute, it should not be adjudged excessive.32
2 Id. at 15-16.
1Id. at 16.
11Id. at 17.
"9Id. at 23-33. Judge Boreman also attacked the majority's disposition of several other issues
in the case. See notes 10 & 13 supra.
"No. 71-1885 at 33.
31Id. at 30.
32See id. at 31, 33.
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PRECEDENT AND THE APPLICATION OF THE PROPORTIONALITY THEORY
That the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unu-
sual punishment" 33 requires proportionality in sentencing is well set-
tled. 34 The United States Supreme Court held in 1910 that it is "a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense, ' 35 and at least twice since that time the Court
has reiterated support for the theory.36 However, Judge Boreman cor-
rectly recognized that a methodology for applying the theory "has never
definitely and conclusively been determined. ' 3 Indeed, courts when
faced with a claim of an excessive punishment often never reach analysis
and dismiss the challenge on grounds either that the punishment was
within the limits of statutory law 8 or that the sentencing judge did not
abuse his discretion.39 The few courts that have reached the merits
typically have considered only whether the punishment, when compared
with the crime, "shocks the conscience." 40 Only a miniscule number
have developed objective tests to aid in analysis, 1, and none have given
much attention to justifying the criteria they have used.4 2 Attention will
now be directed to these latter decisions in an attempt to evaluate the
criteria used in Hart.
"The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.l (1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"'See. e.g., Note, Judicial Limitations on the Constitutional Protection Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 162, authorities cited note 4 supra.
31Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
"See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962); (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
3'Hart v. Coiner, No. 71-1885 at 33 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973)..
'See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 266 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 200 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462, 467 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir.
1959); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38,43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1959); United
States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1959); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338,
340-41 (8th Cir. 1930).
"See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir.1971) (citing general rule);
United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir. 1965).
"See, e.g., Coon v. United States, 360 F.2d 550, 555 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873
(1966); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96, (6th Cir. 1957); United States v. Rosenburg, 195 F.2d
583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 64,
196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946).
"See, e.g., cases cited notes 44-45, 56-57 infra.
"But see In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). After reviewing
proportionality precedent, Lynch applied three of the four factors used in Hart without mentioning
the legislative purpose criterion. However, the court did not say that its test was constitutionally
required. Nor did the tribunal offer a thorough theoretical justification for its test.
19731
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Several courts are in accord with Hart in stressing the trivial nature
of the offense43 as an important factor to be considered.'" In Weems,
for example, the Supreme Court emphasized that the defendant was
falsely claiming only a few hundred pesos as a government expenditure45
and that the offender gained nothing from this crime and injured no
one.4" In O'Neil v. Vermont47 Justice Field stressed that the liquor of-
fense for which that defendant was convicted in Vermont was not even
a crime in New York, the defendant's residence." Further, the defen-
dant's only connection with Vermont was certain jugs of liquor which
he had sent to that state via common carrier.49
Other courts have stressed the nonviolent nature of the crime in
judging proportionality. A Michigan court"0 emphasized that the sale of
marijuana was a nonviolent crime in holding that a compulsory prison
sentence of twenty years for that offense was "so excessive that it
'shocks the conscience.' ,,5' Yet, the absence of violence is not necessar-
ily a requirement for a finding of disproportionality. In Ralph v.
Warden, 2 for example, in which the defendant had been convicted of
forcible rape and sentenced to death, the court, although conceding that
"'there is a sense in which life is always endangered by sexual at-
tack' -3 stated that "there are rational gradations of culpability that
can be made on the basis of injury to the victim. 54 Thus, the court held
that, since life was neither endangered not threatened in the case before
it, the death sentence was disproportionate to the crime.55
"No. 71-1885 at 10 ("The bad check case was very nearly trivial .. ").
"See United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 1970); Faulkner v. State, 445
P.2d 815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968).
"217 U.S. at 358, 366 see Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968).
"1217 U.S. at 365.
17j44 U.S. 323 (1892).
111d. at 337 (dissenting opinion). This opinion was relied upon heavily by the majority in
Weenis.
"Id. at 337-41.
"OPeople v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
"Id. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834.
1438 F.2d 786, (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
"id. at 788, quoting Packer, supra note 4, at 1077.
11438 F.2d at 788.
'While this harm-no harm dichotomy may be useful in establishing a general hierarchy of
crime, it leaves many unanswered questions:
There is a virtually infinite array of conduct engaged in daily by all of us that carries
with it some danger to persons or property. The risk may be a great risk of some small
danger or a small risk of some great danger. The danger may be of short-run conse-
quences or of long-run accumulation of minor problems. The risk may be of direct
physical harm or harm to property, or it may be indirect. ...
[Vol. 52
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Probably the most extensively used criteria are those that compare
the punishment for a particular crime with punishments for similar
crimes in other jurisdictions" and with other crimes in the same jurisdic-
tion.5 Weems relied extensively on this comparative approach because
"the sentence in this case may be illustrated by examples even better
than it can be represented by words. '15 The Court showed the excessive-
ness of the penalties for falsifying a public document by listing a variety
of more serious federal crimes that were not punished so severely. The
Court also examined the punishment for an offense of the same general
nature as that charged and found that "the highest punishment possible
for a crime which may cause the loss of many thousands of dollars, and
to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater
than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public
Wheeler, supra note 4, at 862.
Hart's evaluation of the nature of the crime might seem inconsistent with its analysis in Ralph.
In both bases the defendant was given the maximum punishment allowable for any crime in the
respective jurisdictions. Hart was given a life sentence and Ralph, a death sentence. Since Ralph
held that the absence of actual or threatened violence was determinative, arguably Hart could have
found disproportionality without discussin the trivial nature of the crimes involved.
One possible basis for this difference in evaluation is that Hart considered the variance in the
severity of capital punishment and life imprisonment significant; thus, the petitioner's sentence
could not have been held disproportionate to his crimes without a finding that his culpability was
less than that of the defendant in Ralph. In addition, however, Hart differed from Ralph by
focusing on an analysis of the combined relevant factors. Hart then was characterizing the crimes
as only one part of its evaluation. Without a thorough evaluation of the nature of the crimes, the
data available for the court's analysis would have been incomplete.
Indeed, it would seem that any analysis should focus on evaluation both of the nature of the
crime and of the punishment involved in a case since the theory as stated in Weerns establishes
these factors as unknowns in the proportionality equation. At least arguable, however, is the notion
that the comparative test, discussed in text accompanying notes 56-62 infra, is a better measure of
the nature of a crime than an abstract evaluation because legislatures in setting punishments have
tended to establish hierarchies of crime according to their different levels of culpability. On the
other hand, Hart's cumulative test, No. 11-1885 at 9, has the advantage of giving the appellate
court more data to use in dealing with a complex subject. For instance, the nature-of-the-crime
test permits the consideration of mitigating circumstances where the appellate court deems this is
necessary.
"1See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786,791-92 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 58-59, 245 P.2d 788,
792-93 (1952); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 179, 194 N.W.2d 827, 832 (1972).
5TSee O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (dissenting opinion); State v. Evans, 73
Idaho 50, 59, 245 P.2d 788, 793 (1952); Dembrowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252-53, 240 N.E.wd
815, 816-17 (1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 176-78, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831-32 (1972);
State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 426 (1878); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 632-33, 281 P.2d 233,
235 (1955).
"1217 U.S. at 380. The Court did not, however, state or even suggest that this test was
mandated by the eighth amendment.
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account." 59
Although few courts have attempted to justify this test, one has
stated that "an objective indication of society's 'evolving standards of
decency' can be drawn from the trend of legislative action."' " Another
has stated that although there may be isolated instances of excessive
punishment enacted by the legislature because of transitory public emo-
tion, a legislature will usually "act with due and deliberate regard for
constitutional restraints in prescribing the vast majority of punish-
ments. ... 61 Thus, the criminal statutes are "illustrative of constitu-
tionally permissible degrees of severity; and if among them are found
more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question,
the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect.""2
In support of a legislative purpose test, 63 Hart turned to Justice
'd. at 381. Several commentators have asserted, however, that Weems' support for the
comparative test was undermined in a later Supreme Court case. Turkington, Unconstitutionalhy
Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weens Principle, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 145, 148 (1967); Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996, 1008-09 (1964); Note,
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Eighth Amendment Applied to Sentence
Within Statutory Limits, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 882, 884 (1969). In Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391 (1916) (Holmes, J.), the defendant claimed that a thirty-five year prison sentence, five
years for each of seven separate letters deposited in the mail in the execution of a scheme to
defeaud, was disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 393. This allegation was dismissed cursorily.
Id. at 394. The significant aspect of Badders is that Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court,
cited Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903), a case expressing strong opposition to the compara-
tive test: "That for other offenses, which may be considered by most, if not all, of a more grievous
character, less punishments have been inflicted does not make the sentence cruel." Id. at 135-36
(dictum). The citation may have been a deliberate attempt to weaken the comparative test since
Holmes had joined Justice White in dissenting in Weems.
There are several possible mitigating factors in the Badders case, however. First, its preceden-
tial value is limited by the brevity of the Court's attention to the eighth amendment issue. More
importantly, Weems, which was decided just six years before, was not even cited in Badders. Justice
Holmes' main objection to Weems was his opposition to the proportionality theory itself and not
to its method of application. See 217 U.S. at 385 (White, J., dissenting). Certainly, a citation to
Justice White's dissent would have better served his purposes. The Court may have tipped its hand
when it berated the petitioner for stating a vast number of obviously feckless grounds for relief
and then refused to consider them. See 240 U.S. at 394. In addition, the Court may have felt it
unnecessary to use an objective analysis because the crime and punishment did not initially "shock
their conscience." See note 68 infra.
"Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 186, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
"In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 426, 503 P.2d 921, 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 228 (1972). It may
be questioned whether a state's statutory scheme is the result of its conscious adherence to eighth
amendment standards rather than solely a response to what it considers relevant policy considera-
tions.
621d.
'No. 71-1885 at 11.
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Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia.64 However Justice
Brennan, unlike the Court in Weems, did not believe that proportional-
ity should be analyzed by a combination of factors. Rather he asserted
that proportionality is overshadowed by a lack-of-necessity test: "Al-
though the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be
grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the
more significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose
more effectively than a less severe punishment." 5 Neither Justice Bren-
nan nor the majority in Weems suggested how such a test would be
implemented. In fact, proof that a more serious punishment fulfills a
legislative purpose better than a lesser punishment may be impossible.6
Lacking such evidence courts are likely to turn to conclusory statements
such as those encountered in Hart.6 7 Throughout its discussion of this
test general abhorrence was expressed at the severity of the punishment
for suqh insignificant crimes.
68
01408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972). Justices Marshall and White also expressed support for this test
in their concurring opinions, id. at 311, 331.
"Id. at 280.
"iWheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment I1: The Eighth Amendment After Fur-
man v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62,77-78, (1972).
"See No. 71-1885 at 12.
The court never suggested a lesser punishment that would serve the deterrent purpose as well
as life imprisonment even though it commented that life imprisonment is justified only on the
theory that "more is better." Id. at 13.
Also, the court apparently misread the deterrent theory when it commented that "if a life
sentence is good for the purpose [of deterrence], surely a death sentence would be better." Id. at
11-12. Implicitly, this position recognizes only the fear function of deterrence: "the criminal who
engages in rational decision-making will consider the possible penalties for various choices of
action and, other things being equal, will act in the way which holds the least dangerous conse-
quences." Wheeler, supra note 66, at 75. It has been recognized, however, that deterrence consists
of an educational function as well. See, e.g., Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?,
43 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 176, 179-80 (1952). Theoretically, a criminal statutory structure imports
to the citizenry the immorality of various types of conduct, with the goal that "[p]unishments are
thereby supposed to create not only conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing
crime, but also inhibitions against committing a more severe crime rather than a less severe one."
Wheeler, supra note 66, at 75. Thus, to argue that a death sentence would as well serve the deterrent
purpose as life imprisonment in regard to a particular crime is lacking in its failure to consider
the effect of the increased sentence on the entire scheme of statutory crimes.
Of course, a more basic question than whether the legislative purpose test is proper as applied in
Weems concerns whether the test is proper at all. For a thorough analysis that concludes that the
legislative purpose test is subsumed by a proper proportionality test in most instances and is
impractical in the remaining, see Wheeler, supra note 66, at 71-79.
r'This general abhorrence suggests that the punishment "shocked the conscience" of the court
independently of the tribunal's proportionality analysis. We may speculate that the court will not
give extended consideration to the substance of an eighth amendment challenge unless it is initially
shocked. See Turkington, supra note 59, at 148. Supporting this notion is United States v. True-
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PROPORTIONALITY IN PERSPECTIVE
Although Hart fails to provide justification for its proportionality
analysis, the decision at least attempted to develop a methodology for
applying the eighth amendment. The constitutionally required criteria
are important because they may potentially force courts to do more than
pronounce their boiler plate that sentences will not be reviewed either
because they are within statutory limits or because there was no abuse
of discretion. Hart's contribution will be minimal, however, if courts use
the criteria only after determining that their consciences are shocked, a
possibility suggested earlier.6 9 The analysis still would limit wholly
subjective determinations of disproportionality.
Even if the Hart analysis is applied in all cases in which proportion-
ality is in issue, objectively should not be overemphasized. In Trop v.
Dulles the Supreme Court only commanded that reviewing the constitu-
tionality of a statute "requires the exercise of judgment, not the reliance
on personal preferences."7 Ralph v. Warden, however, stated: "The
constitutionality of Ralph's punishment cannot rest on the subjective
opinions of the judges who imposed the sentence or of the judges who
must review the case. On the contrary, his punishment must be tested
objectively."' 7' While Ralph apparently intended only to paraphrase
Trop's admonition, its language may be misunderstood. No analysis of
proportionality can be wholly objective, for the "evolving standard""2
used in evaluating punishments under the eighth amendment precludes
development of a formula that will almost automatically produce a
conclusion. The criteria, set forth in Hart, therefore, should be viewed
as placing limits on appellate subjectivity rather than supplanting it. The
guidelines should amelioriate the situation that compelled one writer to
love, No. 72-2495 (4th cir., Aug. 9, 1973) (per curiam) (Craven & Boreman, JJ., joining Winter,
J., in an unanimous decision), in which the court, upon rejecting a challenge to a five year sentence
stated: "In the absence of the most exceptional circumstances, a sentence that does not exceed the
statutory limits is within the sole discretion of the trial judge and an appellate court has no
authority to review it." Id. at 2. Also, in Wood v. South Carolina, (No. 72-1336 (4th Cir., July
13, 1973), the court rejected a challenge of disproportionality without employing the cumulative
test used in Hart. The petitioner in Wood had plead guilty to two counts of making an obscene
telephone call and was sentenced tb a term of five years in prison on each count, the sentences to
run concurrently. Surely, if Hart had established a proportionality test of general applicability, this
test would have been used in Wood, an opinion handed down the same day as Hart and decided
by the same panel.
"See supra note 68.
70356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
71438 F.2d 786, 789 (1970), citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
72438 F.2d at 101; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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conclude: "[I]t probably makes little practical difference in most cases
whether a judge professes to follow community conscience or not. The
appeal is essentially to his own innate standards of fairness and human-
ity."73
Furthermore, there may be a distinction between appellate review
of statutes requiring mandatory sentences and of statutes allowing judi-
cial discretion in setting the punishment. In Wood v. South Carolina,
74
the court in its very brief analysis stressed that the sentencing judge may
have considered the defendant's prior record of convictions in setting the
punishment. In Hart, on the other hand, it was emphasized that the
judge was totally without discretion. 75 The assumption in Hart may have
been that either at the trial court or appellate level there must be a
consideration of personally mitigating circumstances in evaluating pro-
portionality. This, however, does not negate appellate review of punish-
ments given in the discretion of the sentencing judge. To the contrary,
the appellate court might find that there are no personal circumstances
that could justify the punishment because of the great discrepancy be-
tween the crime and punishment on their face-a discrepancy deter-
mined from the use of criteria like those used in Hart, albeit without
consideration of personal circumstances.
Proportionality analysis is not yet, if it ever will be, a safeguard
against the myriad inequities in sentencing practices. As the Fourth
Circuit cases discussed above illustrate, the courts have had difficulty
in applying the eighth amendment standard. In addition, legislatures
have much more flexibility to deal with the broad policy questions
involved in developing well integrated sentencing schemes. Nevertheless,
the courts must not abdicate their responsibility under the constitution
to nullify a punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense commit-
ted To effectuate this mandate, they must criticize and improve the
criteria used in Hart.
JOE STALLINGS
"Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 4, at 851.
7'4No. 72-1336 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973).
71No. 71-1885 at 14-15.
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